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Population Axiology and the
Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value
Johan E. Gustafsson
Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid
both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet
Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is,
it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse
than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I de-
fend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadis-
tic Conclusion. This is made possible by what I call ‘undistinguishedness’, a fourth
category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality.
In addition to the good, the bad, and the neutral, there is an overlooked fourth
category of absolute value. This category provides, I shall argue, a way to avoid a
number of problematic conclusions in population ethics that are not only counter-
intuitive but also morally repugnant. The possibility of this overlooked category
enables a new variation of Total Utilitarianism, which avoids repugnance not only in
the aggregation of the value of lives in populations but also in the aggregation of the
value of dierent moments within a life. In this way, it delivers a population axiology
without repugnance.
Before we begin, however, we need to introduce some terminology. A population
is a set of all lives within a possible world. The well-being level of a life is the personal
value for the person living it, which we shall assume is interpersonally measurable.
Categories of absolute well-being correspond, accordingly, to categories of absolute
personal value. So, for example,
A good (bad, neutral) well-being level is a well-being level such that a life at that
level would be good (bad, neutral) for the person living it.1
The most straightforward population axiology is perhaps Total Utilitarianism. Let
the total value of a population X be
∑
l ∈ X
w(l)
1 Good and bad well-being are oen called positive and negative well-being, respectively. This,
however, suggests that good well-being levels are represented by positive numbers, and bad well-being
levels are represented by negative numbers, which—as will become obvious—wouldn’t be congenial to
our discussion.
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wherew(l) is the well-being level of life l with zero representing the neutral well-being
level. According to
Total Utilitarianism
A population X is at least good as a population Y if and only if the total value
of X is at least as great as the total value of Y .
Total utilitarianism has a counter-intuitive implication known as the Repugnant
Conclusion. The following is Derek Part’s canonical formulation:
The Repugnant Conclusion (canonical formulation)
For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose
existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members
have lives that are barely worth living.2
This conclusion is oen put in terms of a comparison between an A population—a
large population consisting of lives that are very good for the people who live them—
and a Z population—an enormous population consisting of lives that are barely worth
living. In the following diagram, the populations are represented by boxes, where the
width represents the size of the population and the height represents the well-being
level of the lives in the population. The dashed part of the Z box indicates that it can
be thought of as having a much larger size.
the neutral level
well-being
the good range
the bad range
A Z
The canonical formulation talks about lives that are ‘barely worth living’. This can
plausibly be read in at least two ways.3 On a rst reading, these are lives at a well-being
level only marginally higher than some bad well-being level. This reading would be
2 Part (1984, p. 388).
3 Furthermore, Part sometimes writes as if good lives are those that are worth living and bad lives
are those that are not worth living. He (1984, p. 487) writes, for example, that ‘a life of a certain kind
may be judged to be either good or bad—either worth living, or not worth living.’ I wonder whether
he regards a neutral life as worth living.
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The Repugnant Conclusion (barely-not-bad version)
Each population consisting of lives at a very good well-being level is worse than
some population consisting of lives at a well-being level that is just marginally
higher than some bad well-being level.4
On a second reading, these are lives at a well-being level just marginally higher than
some well-being level that isn’t good. That reading would be
The Repugnant Conclusion (barely-good version)
Each population consisting of lives at a very good well-being level is worse than
some population consisting of lives at a well-being level that is just marginally
higher than some well-being level that is not good.
The dierence between these two versions is of little importance if we assume
The Personal Absolute Trichotomy Thesis
For every well-being level, exactly one of the following holds: (i) it is a good
well-being level, (ii) it is a bad well-being level, or (iii) it is a neutral well-being
level.
That is, a life is good, bad, or neutral for the person living it. This is an instance of a
more general view, which we can call
The Absolute Trichotomy Thesis
For every value bearer, exactly one of the following holds: (i) it is good, (ii) it is
bad, or (iii) it is neutral.5
While the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis is standard, we shall li this assumptions later.
1. Critical-Level Utilitarianism
Critical-Level Utilitarianism is a family of ethical theories which generalizes Total
Utilitarianism. It does this by replacing total value with critical total value, which is
relative to a certain critical well-being level. We calculate the critical total value of a
population by rst subtracting the critical level from the well-being level of each life
in the population and then the critical total value is the sum total of these dierences.
Equivalently, in mathematical notation, we let the critical total value of a population X
relative to a certain critical well-being level w be
∑
l ∈ X
(w(l) −w)
4 I have dropped the weakening in the canonical formulation that the worse population has to
include at least ten billion people. I don’t see the theoretical motivation for this complication. There
seems to be no plausible theory that violates the condition without the weakening which doesn’t also
violate it with the weakening. The weakening to populations of at least ten billion people will not
matter for our discussion.
5 Compare Chang’s (1997, p. 4) comparative Trichotomy Thesis.
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where again w(l) is the well-being level of life l . This generalization makes it possible
to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. According to
Critical-Level Utilitarianism
A population X is at least as good as a population Y if and only if the critical
total value of X relative to the critical level w is at least as great as the critical
total value of Y relative to w.6
To avoid the Repugnant Conclusion with this approach, we just need a critical level
suciently higher than the neutral level so that it’s unrepugnant that a very large
population where everyone has a level of well-being barely above the critical level
is better than a smaller population where everyone has very high well-being. This
gain, however, comes at a price: If the critical level is higher than the neutral level
with some margin (so that it is also higher than at least one good well-being level),
Critical-Level Utilitarianism entails
The Sadistic Conclusion
Each population consisting of lives at bad well-being levels is better than some
population consisting of lives at good well-being levels.7
The Sadistic Conclusion seems at least as repugnant as the Repugnant Conclusion.
And the Sadistic Conclusion follows from Critical-Level Utilitarianism if there is a
good well-being level below the critical level, because then one canmake an arbitrarily
bad population by increasing the size of a population in which everyone has this
level of well-being. To see this, compare a mirrored, bad variant of the A population
where everyone has a life that’s very bad for them, which we can call Bad A, and the
Z population, which consists of lives at a good well-being level below the critical level:
the neutral level
the critical level
well-being
the good range
the bad range
Bad A Z
6 Blackorby andDonaldson (1984, p. 14). Broome (2004, p. 255) calls this the integrated standardized
total principle.
7 Arrhenius (2000b, p. 256).
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Regardless of how bad Bad A is, we can make Z even worse by making it suciently
large, because each life in Z reduces the value of Z by the same amount. So, to avoid
the Sadistic Conclusion, we need a bad or almost neutral critical level. But with a bad
or almost neutral critical level, we again get the Repugnant Conclusion. Hence we are
stuck with either the Repugnant Conclusion or the Sadistic Conclusion.
There are also mirrored variants of the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic
Conclusion. These variants are like mirror images, where ‘good’ has been replaced
with ‘bad’, ‘bad’ with ‘good’, ‘better’ with ‘worse’, and ‘worse’ with ‘better’:
The Mirrored Repugnant Conclusion (barely-not-good version)
Each population consisting of lives at a very bad well-being level is better than
some population consisting of lives at a well-being level that is marginally lower
than a good well-being level.8
The Mirrored Sadistic Conclusion
Each population consisting of lives at good well-being levels is worse than some
population consisting of lives at bad well-being levels.
Unless the critical level is suciently lower than the neutral level, Critical-Level
Utilitarianism entails the Mirrored Repugnant Conclusion. And, if the critical level
is lower than the neutral level with some margin so that it is lower than at least one
bad well-being level, then Critical-Level Utilitarianism entails the Mirrored Sadistic
Conclusion. Thus, for any version of Critical-Level Utilitarianism, either it entails
the Mirrored Repugnant Conclusion or it entails the Mirrored Sadistic Conclusion.
Hence any version of Critical-Level Utilitarianism entails at least two of the mirrored
and non-mirrored variants of the Repugnant and Sadistic Conclusions. So, to avoid
repugnance, we need to revise Total Utilitarianism in some other way.
2. Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism
An alternative approach that can avoid all of these counter-intuitive implications is
Critical-Range Utilitarianism. A basic assumption of both Total and Critical-Level
Utilitarianism is that there’s a single well-being level of neutral contributive value—
that is, a single well-being level such that adding a life at that level leaves the value of
the population unchanged. Critical-Range Utilitarianism drops this assumption. The
8 Carlson (1998, p. 297) calls this claim ‘the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion’, and Broome (2004,
p. 213) calls it ‘the Negative Repugnant Conclusion’. The problemwith the name ‘the Reverse Repugnant
Conclusion’ is its lack of descriptiveness. The Repugnant Conclusion can be reversed in more than
one way. Arrhenius (2000a, p. 57), for example, uses the name ‘the Reversed Repugnant Conclusion’
for the claim that each population consisting of lives at a very good well-being level is worse than
some population consisting of just one life at a slightly higher well-being level than the lives in the rst
population. And the problem with the name ‘the Negative Repugnant Conclusion’ is that it doesn’t
make sense to call the Mirrored Sadistic Conclusion ‘the Negative Sadistic Conclusion’, since each of
the Mirrored and the Standard Sadistic Conclusion concerns populations with bad well-being. But the
names of these mirrored conclusions should, ideally, reect their shared relation to their non-mirrored
counterparts.
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basic idea is that there is a critical range of two or more well-being levels such that
additions of lives at a well-being level in this range will, other things being equal, make
the resulting population incomparable with the original population. According to
Critical-Range Utilitarianism
A population X is at least as good as a population Y if and only if, for all well-
being levels w in the critical range, the critical total value of X relative to w is at
least as great as the critical total value of Y relative to w.9
On this view, one compares two populations X and Y by calculating, for each well-
being level in the critical range, how Critical-Level Utilitarianism would rank X and
Y if this well-being level were the critical level. If Critical-Level Utilitarianism would
yield that X is at least as good as Y regardless of which level in the critical range
were the critical level, then X is at least as good as Y . If, on the other hand, whether
Critical-Level Utilitarianism would yield that X is at least as good as Y depends on
which level in the critical range were the critical level, then X and Y are incomparable,
that is, X is not at least as good as Y and Y is not at least as good as X.
Critical-Range Utilitarianism avoids both the Repugnant Conclusion and the
Mirrored Sadistic Conclusion if the upper bound of the critical range is suciently
higher than the neutral level. And it avoids the Mirrored Repugnant Conclusion and
the Sadistic Conclusion if the lower bound of the critical range is suciently lower
than the neutral level. So, given a critical range with an upper bound suciently
higher than the neutral level and a lower bound suciently lower than the neutral
level, we avoid each of the Repugnant Conclusion, the Sadistic Conclusion, and their
mirrored variants. We can call this kind of critical-Range Utilitarianism
Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism
Critical-Range Utilitarianism with a critical range that includes the neutral
well-being level and a range of good and bad well-being levels.
While Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion
and its mirrored variant, it still has some counter-intuitive implications. It entails
two weakened variants of the Sadistic Conclusion and its mirrored variant. These
weakened variants are just like the originals except that ‘better than’ have been replaced
with ‘not worse than’ and ‘worse than’ with ‘not better than’:
The Weak Sadistic Conclusion
Each population consisting of lives at bad well-being levels is not worse than
some population consisting of lives at good well-being levels.
The Weak Mirrored Sadistic Conclusion
Each population consisting of lives at good well-being levels is not better than
some population consisting of lives at bad well-being levels.
9 Blackorby et al. (1996, p. 141) called this Incomplete Critical-Level Utilitarianism, but they (2005,
p. 252) later renamed it Critical-Band Utilitarianism. Rabinowicz (2009, p. 404) and Qizilbash (2007)
propose a similar views.
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It seems that any population consisting of lives at good well-being levels is better
than any population consisting of lives at bad well-being levels. To see that Standard
Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, compare again
the Bad A and Z, where Z consists of lives at a good well-being level in the critical
range such that there is at least one higher level in the range:
the neutral level
well-being
the good range
the bad range
the critical range
Bad A Z
No matter which well-being level the lives in Bad A are at, we can make Z suciently
large so that, for some well-being level in the critical range, the critical total value
relative to that level is lesser for Z than for Bad A; and then Bad A isn’t worse than Z.
Hence Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion.
And—by an analogous argument comparing A with a mirrored, bad variant of Z
consisting of lives at a bad well-being level in the critical range such that the range
includes at least one lower level—we have that Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism
entails the Weak Mirrored Sadistic Conclusion.
As Wlodek Rabinowicz points out, we get these weakened sadistic conclusions
because we have given up
The Equivalence of Personal and Contributive Value
The addition of a life, other things being equal,
• makes a population better if and only if the life is at a good well-being
level,
• makes a population worse if and only if the life is at a bad well-being level,
and
• leaves the value of the population unchanged if and only if the life is at a
neutral well-being level.10
10 Rabinowicz (2009, p. 391) states the equivalence in comparative rather than absolute terms:
adding a person to a world at a certain level of wellbeing makes the world better (worse) if
and only if a life at this level of wellbeing is better (worse) than non-existence for a person
who leads that life.
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One of the main attractions of Total Utilitarianism is that it satises this equivalence,
which is how it avoids each of these sadistic conclusions. In addition to avoiding these
sadistic conclusions, there’s a further reason why the equivalence of personal and
contributive value is a desideratum: If this principle were false, we would need some
other explanation for why a person’s life makes the world better (worse) than the
straightforward one that that life is good (bad) for that person.
3. Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism
Critical-Range Utilitarianism is incompatible with the equivalence of personal and
contributive value if there’s only one well-being level that is neither good nor bad. Yet
Critical-Range Utilitarianism could be compatible with this equivalence if multiple
well-being levels were neither good nor bad.11 The existence of two or more such
levels is ruled out by the Personal Absolute Trichotomy Thesis and the more general
Absolute Trichotomy Thesis.
These theses, however, are challenged by a recent development in the logic of value.
There are reasons to believe that, in addition to good, bad, or neutral value bearers,
there’s a fourth category of value bearers. These value bearers are undistinguished:
Something is undistinguished if and only if it is a value bearer and not good,
not bad, and not neutral.12
If we accept the possibility of value incomparability—which we must if we accept
Critical-Range Utilitarianism—then it seems that something neutral could be incom-
parable with something else. Consider the following standard principles for the logic
of value:13
Unlike my principle, Rabinowicz’s principle requires comparisons of personal value between existence
and non-existence, which is controversial; see, for example, Williams (1973, p. 87), Part (1984, p. 487),
and Broome (1993, p. 77).
11 Rabinowicz (2009, pp. 390–391, 406) suggests a similar idea. On his proposal, however, some
neutral well-being levels are better for the individual than other neutral well-being levels. This violates
claims (1)–(3), presented below.
12 Carlson (1997, p. 101), Espinoza (2009, p. 35), and Gustafsson (2016, p. 855). Note that, in order
for something to be undistinguished, it has to be a value bearer. We distinguish things that are
undistinguished from those that are completely void of value:
Something is void of value if and only if it is not a value bearer.
Espinoza (2009, p. 35) uses the term ‘void’ to cover both the things that, in my terminology, are
undistinguished and those that are void of value. But something’s being ‘void’ of value connotes, I
think, its not being a value bearer. Carlson (2016, p. 217), on the other hand, calls things that are
undistinguished ‘indeterminate’. But this is misleading, since there needn’t be anything indeterminate
about the absolute value of these things—they can be determinately not good, not bad, and not neutral
but determinately undistinguished. Unlike things that are void of value, things that are undistinguished
can, since they are value bearers, be better or worse than other things. Finally, Rabinowicz (2009,
p. 390) calls things that are undistinguished simply ‘neutral’. But this is not, as Broome (2004, p. 170)
remarks, ‘neutrality as it intuitively should be.’ Neutrality in the intuitive sense satises (1), (2), and (3)
dened below.
13 Chisholm and Sosa (1966, p. 248) and Carlson (2016, pp. 220–221).
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(1) If x is neutral, then, y is good if and only if y is better than x.
(2) If x is neutral, then, y is bad if and only if y is worse than x.
(3) If x is neutral, then, y is neutral if and only if y is equally good as x.
Then suppose that a rst, neutral thing is incomparable with a second value bearer.
By (1), the second value bearer cannot be good, because, if it were good, it would have
been better than the rst. By (2), it cannot be bad, because, if it were bad, it would
have been worse than the rst. And, by (3), it cannot be neutral, because, if it were
neutral, it would have been equally good as the rst. So the second value bearer must
be undistinguished.14 Hence
(4) If x is neutral, then, y is undistinguished if and only if y is incomparable with x.
Our characterization of something’s being undistinguished is mostly negative, in
the sense that it mainly states what properties the thing lacks, that is, the thing’s
not belonging to one of the other categories of absolute value. This lack of a more
informative, positive characterization might come across as a weakness. But note that
undistinguishedness is supposed to correspond to value incomparability, just like
goodness corresponds to betterness, badness corresponds to worseness, and neutrality
corresponds to equality in value in the manner outlined by (1)–(4).15 So, given that
value incomparability is characterized negatively, it seems that the corresponding
absolute category should be so too.
It may be objected that there it is still unsatisfactory that either of incomparability
and undistinguishedness is characterized negatively. My arguments, however, do not
depend on there being no positive characterization of undistinguishedness. While I
won’t provide a positive characterization, some of the mystery of undistinguishedness
can be cleared by looking at how incomparability functions in the overall structure of
value. The standard picture of value without incomparability looks like this:
better (more goodness)
worse (less goodness)
equally good
14 Carlson (2011, p. 58) provides another, slightly more complicated argument based on comparisons
with concatenated objects. A further argument in favour of recognizing undistinguishedness is that
other contraries like “tall” and “short” admit a range of intermediate (“medium height”) levels.
15 We may distinguish, following Chang (1997, pp. 27–28) and Bader (2015, p. 190), the following:
x and y are incomparable if and only if (i) neither of x and y is at least as good as the other and
(ii) both of them are value bearers.
x and y are non-comparable if and only if (i) neither of x and y is at least as good as the other
and (ii) at least one of them is not a value bearer.
Any undistinguished thing is incomparable (rather than non-comparable) with any neutral thing.
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On this picture, there is a single dimension of value, along which dierent points
dier in goodness. All points along the goodness dimension are comparable. So, if
there is incomparability, there has to be a further dimension:
purely better (more pure goodness)
purely worse (less pure goodness)
purely more undistinguishedpurely less undistinguished
equally good
Points along the new dimension that is orthogonal to the goodness dimension dier
in undistinguishedness. Note that the pure value relations only covers points that only
dier in one of the two dimensions. Let a point be better (worse) than another point
if and only if it has more (less) pure goodness and the dierence in pure goodness
is greater than the dierence in pure undistinguishedness. Let a point be equally
good as another point if and only if it has the same amount of pure goodness and the
same amount of pure undistinguishedness (that is, if it is the same point). And let
a point be incomparable with another point if and only if the points dier in pure
undistinguishedness and the dierence in pure undistinguishedness is at least as great
as the dierence in pure goodness. We get the following kind of picture:16
incomparable incomparable
better
worse
equally good
By comparing points to the neutral point in this manner, we get the following picture
of absolute value:
16 These diagrams are structurally similar toMinkowski’s (1909, p. 82) space-time diagrams. They are
both represent ordered vector spaces; see Schaefer (1966, pp. 204–214) for a mathematical treatment.
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purely better
purely worse
purely incomparableneutral
good
bad
undistinguished
The neutral point is a point with no (positive or negative) goodness and no undistin-
guishedness. While goodness dimension has a negative extension—that is, the range
of badness—we do not need to assume (for the purposes of this paper) that there is a
negative extension of the undistinguishedness dimension.17
Given this fourth category of absolute value, we also have a fourth category of
absolute well-being:
An undistinguished well-being level is a well-being level such that a life at that
level would be undistinguished for the person living it.
The possibility of undistinguished well-being levels allows for a critical range consist-
ing of well-being levels that are neither good nor bad.18 One cannot have a critical
range consisting of two or more neutral levels. Given completeness, if two well-being
17 To account for incomparability in pluralist theories of value, this picture could be extended with
further dimensions of undistinguishedness, which are orthogonal to the goodness dimension and to
each other. For example, undistinguishedness of apples could be orthogonal to the undistinguishedness
of pears.
18 This idea of a category of value other than goodness or badness which allows for value dierences
within that category dates back to the Stoics, who distinguished between things that are good, bad,
and indierent yet allowed that indierent things could dier in value. Sextus Empiricus (Math. 11.62;
1997, p. 13) explains their view as follows:
Now, of indierents they say that some are preferred, some dispreferred, and some
neither preferred nor dispreferred; and that preferred are things which have sucient
value, dispreferred are those which have sucient disvalue, and neither preferred nor
dispreferred is a thing such as extending or bending one’s nger, and everything like
that.
Note, however, that this value, in terms of which the Stoics distinguished indierent things, is not the
same as goodness. To many Stoics, value and goodness are dierent standards; see Long and Sedley
(1987, pp. 357–359).
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levels are distinct, it must be better for a person to have a life at one of these levels
than to have a life at the other level. But, by (3), if both of these levels are neutral, it
must be equally good for a person to have a life at either of these levels. Thus there
cannot be two or more neutral well-being levels. There can, however, be multiple
undistinguished well-being levels. The main dierence between value incompara-
bility and equality in value is that, if two things are equally good, any improvement
(deterioration) of one of them would make it better (worse) than the other. If, on
the other hand, two things are incomparable, there should be some improvement
or deterioration of one of the things such that it wouldn’t make the thing better or
worse than the other thing.19Analogously, the main dierence between neutrality and
undistinguishedness is that, if something is neutral, any improvement (deterioration)
of that thing would make it good (bad). But, if something is undistinguished, there
should be some improvement or deterioration that wouldn’t make it good or bad.
So, even if something undistinguished is better than some other things, those other
things might also be undistinguished. Hence, unlike a range of neutral well-being
levels, there doesn’t seem to be anything inconsistent about a range of undistinguished
well-being levels.
The idea is that all lives have a certain amount of undistinguishedness. In terms of
a two-dimensional vector diagram of well-being levels, all possible lives would have a
personal value that is shied slightly to the right of the standard, complete well-being
scale:
purely better
purely worse
purely incomparableneutral
good
bad
undistinguished
possible values of lives
This shi of the possible values of lives creates the undistinguished range of well-being
levels between the good and bad well-being levels.20
19 Raz (1986, pp. 325–326) calls this ‘the mark of incommensurability’.
20 There is no particular reason that the possible values of lives form a straight line; we will consider
population axiology and absolute value 13
This possibility of an undistinguished range of well-being levels enables the fol-
lowing version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism:
Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism
A version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism where the well-being levels in the
critical range are undistinguished, the levels above the range are good, and the
levels below the range are bad.
Unlike Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism, Undistinguished Critical-Range Util-
itarianism avoids the Weak Sadistic Conclusion and its mirrored variant. Just like
Total Utilitarianism, it avoids them because it satises the equivalence of personal
and contributive value. And, given that the critical range is suciently wide, Undistin-
guished Critical-Range Utilitarianism also avoids the barely-not-bad version of the
Repugnant Conclusion and the barely-not-good version of the Mirrored Repugnant
Conclusion.
Rabinowicz has proposed a similar version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism with
a critical range of personal value, which he argues can avoid the barely-not-bad
version of the RepugnantConclusion.21 Themain dierence betweenUndistinguished
Critical-Range Utilitarianism and Rabinowicz’s theory is the underlying theory of
value. The two-dimensional theory of goodness and undistinguishedness provides
an account of how there is a gap between the worst good lives and the best bad lives
and why there is no neutral life. Rabinowicz’s version of the theory, on the other
hand, allows that there could be neutral lives.22 This dierence will matter in the next
section.
To see how Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism avoids the barely-not-
bad version of the Repugnant Conclusion, consider the following two-dimensional
vector diagram:
a more complex proposal in Section 5. The crucial point here is that no possible good life is barely
better than some bad life.
21 Rabinowicz (2009, pp. 391, 406).
22 Rabinowicz (2017). In personal communication, Rabinowicz has told me that in his terminology,
‘neutral’ includes both what I call ‘neutral’ and ‘undistinguished’. I am not sure that this is a mere
terminological dierence. Neutrality is not a technical notion; it is one of the basic, pre-theoretical
concepts of ethics. The neutral is the origin of the evaluative space. Neutral changes are neutral in the
sense that they leave things just as they are in terms of value. Compare Broome’s (2004, p. 142) claim
that ‘“Neutral” means not mattering ethically.’ Given the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis, not mattering
ethically could perhaps be thought to be equivalent to being neither good nor bad, but once we give
up the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis this equivalence does not hold. See also note 49.
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purely better
purely worse
purely incomparable
good
bad
undistinguished
possible values of lives
A-life personal value
A total value
Barely Not Bad Z-life personal value
neutral
Barely Not Bad Z total value
Just like Total Utilitarianism, Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism evaluates
populations by their total personal value. The dierence is that Undistinguished
Critical-Range Utilitarianism deals with two-dimensional personal value, so the value
of each life can be represented by a two-dimensional vector (the two dimensions
being goodness and undistinguishedness). We add up these vectors of personal value
by vector summation—that is, forming a total vector by lining up the personal vectors
one aer another so that the rst vector points to the tail of the next vector and so on;
the total vector points to the end of this combined vector. Since the vectors for the
good lives in A point mostly upwards and the vectors for the barely not bad lives in
Barely Not Bad Z point mostly to the side, no vector sum of the latter could end up
pointing to a point that is above a vector sum of the former.
A nice feature of the vector-based approach is that it shows how the theory could
be extended to cover risky prospects. Normal expected-utility theory rules out incom-
parability. But, given that the value of each population is represented by a vector, we
canmultiply the vector for the population in each possible outcome in a prospect with
its probability and then add up these products with vector summation. The resulting
vector is the expected value of the prospect. The product of vector and a probability
is a vector with the same direction as the original vector but with a length equal to
the original length times the probability.
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Still, Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the barely-good ver-
sion of the Repugnant Conclusion. But this is not, I think, repugnant given that the
critical range is suciently wide and consisting of undistinguished well-being levels.
Given an undistinguished range of well-being levels, the barely-good version of the
Repugnant Conclusion can be illustrated by a comparison between the A population
and a variant of the Z population, which we can call Barely Good Z, consisting of
lives at a well-being level just marginally higher than some well-being level that isn’t
good:
well-being
the good range
the undistinguished range
the bad range A Barely Good Z
Even though the lives in Barely Good Z are at a well-being level only marginally
higher than a well-being level that isn’t good, they are still at a well-being level much
higher than any bad well-being level, which makes the comparison less repugnant.
Another potential source of repugnance is that, even though Undistinguished
Critical-Range Utilitarianism avoids the barely-not-bad version of the Repugnant
Conclusion, it still entails a weakened variant of that version:
The Weak Repugnant Conclusion (barely-not-bad version)
Each population consisting of lives at a very good well-being level is not at least
as good as some population consisting of lives at a well-being level that is just
marginally higher than some bad well-being level.
To see that Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the barely-not-bad
version of the Weak Repugnant Conclusion, compare the A population with a variant
of the Z population, which we can call Barely Not Bad Z, consisting of lives at a
well-being level just marginally higher than a bad well-being level:
population axiology and absolute value 16
well-being
the good range
the undistinguished range
the bad range A Barely Not Bad Z
No matter which well-being level the lives in A are at, we can make Barely Not Bad Z
suciently large so that, for some level in the critical range, the critical total value
relative to that level is greater for Barely Not Bad Z than for A; and then A isn’t at least
as good as Barely Not Bad Z. Changing what needs to be changed, we can show by an
analogous argument that Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism also entails
The Weak Mirrored Repugnant Conclusion (barely-not-good version)
Each population consisting of lives at a very bad well-being level is not at least
as bad as some population consisting of lives at a well-being level that is just
marginally lower than some good well-being level.
Regarding these weakened variants of the Repugnant Conclusion, Undistinguished
Critical-Range Utilitarianism is in same boat as Standard Critical-Range Utilitari-
anism. But the barely-not-bad version of the Weak Repugnant Conclusion and the
barely-not-good version of its mirrored variant are not, I think, very repugnant given
an undistinguished range. To see this, it might help to consider the absolute value of
A and Barely Not Bad Z. Since A consists of a large number of lives at a very good
well-being level, it should be overall (very) good; likewise, since Barely Not Bad Z
consists of a large number of lives at an undistinguished well-being level, it should
be overall (very) undistinguished.23 (That something is very undistinguishedmeans
that its value is a long way from good, bad, and neutral.) It might seem strange that
something good isn’t at least good as anything that is undistinguished and hence
not good. But consider a neutral thing and an undistinguished thing. These two
things must be incomparable. When two things are incomparable rather than equally
good, there could be a small improvement to either of them that doesn’t make the
improved thing at least as good as the other. So there could be some improvement
23 The most straightforward way to extend the approach to provide an account of the absolute value
of populations is as follows:
A population is good (bad, neutral) if and only if, for all well-being levelsw in the critical range,
the critical total value of the population is positive (negative, zero) relative to w.
A population is undistinguished if and only if it is not good, not bad, and not neutral.
Note that, if there is more than one well-being level in the critical range, only the empty population is
neutral.
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of the neutral thing that isn’t at least as good as the thing that is undistinguished.24
But the improvement of the neutral thing must, by (1), be good. Hence there could be
something good that isn’t at least as good as something undistinguished. The idea
behind undistinguishedness is that it is greedy in that it swallows a certain amount of
goodness or badness, which is why a small improvement to one of two incomparable
things need not make it better than the other.25 So, if we just have that x is good and
y is undistinguished, we cannot infer that x is at least as good as y. It seems that,
logically, we can merely conclude that
(5) If x is good and y is undistinguished, then either x is better than y or x is
incomparable with y.26
Changing what needs to be changed, this argument also applies to the barely-not-good
version of the Weak Mirrored Repugnant Conclusion.
4. Are There Lives with Neutral (or Close to Neutral) Personal Value?
So far, I have been assuming full comparability between lives—that is, for any two
lives, the well-being level of one of these lives is at least as high as the well-being
level of the other. By (1), (2), (3), and full comparability between lives, we have that, if
there is a life at a neutral well-being level, then there is no life at an undistinguished
well-being level. Moreover, if there are lives with neutral personal value, then there
are plausibly minimally improved good lives and minimally worsened bad lives. And,
if so, there are good lives that are only barely better than some bad lives, which would
block the way Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism avoids the Repugnant
Conclusion. Let us therefore examine the plausibility of there being lives with neutral
personal value based on various accounts of neutral well-being. I shall argue that lives
with neutral personal value are implausible on all of these accounts.
A rst suggestion, by Broome, is based on temporal well-being, that is, how well
o a person is at a time. Consider the following account of neutrality (goodness, and
badness) for levels of temporal well-being, which we shall adopt:
24 Thus we have a counter-example to the Chisholm and Sosa’s (1966, p. 248) principle
If x is good and y is not good, then x is better than y,
to van Benthem’s (1982, p. 198) more general principle
If x is F and y is not F, then x is Fer than y,
and to the monadic collapsing principle, suggested (but not defended) by Carlson (2013, p. 454),
If it is false that y is F and not false that x is F, then it is true that x is Fer than y.
25 In the appendix, I argue that this feature of undistinguishedness helps us rebut Broome’s objection
from greediness.
26 Carlson (2016, p. 220).
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A person pwho is alive at time t is living at a neutral (good, bad) level of temporal
well-being at t if and only if either
• a life just like p’s life except that it ends just before t would have been
equally good (better, worse) for p as (than) a life just like p’s life except
that it ends just aer t or
• a life just like p’s life except that it started just before t would have been
equally good (better, worse) for p as (than) a life just like p’s life except
that it started just aer t.27
Broome’s suggestion is then that
(6) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only if it is at the same well-being
level as a life which is at each time at a neutral level of temporal well-being.28
One might wonder how a life could fail to be neutral if it’s always at a neutral level of
temporal well-being. It seems that a life cannot be good or bad for the person living
unless it is at some time at a good or bad level of temporal well-being. And one might
wonder how a life could be undistinguished for the person living it if it is at all times
at a neutral level of temporal well-being. Where would the undistinguishedness come
from? The most plausible answer is, I think, that an atemporal component of any life
is to be alive at least some point in time and that component is undistinguished for the
person.29 And, since being alive at least at some point in time is a component of any
possible life, it has no eect on the comparative evaluations of lives. Hence it doesn’t
conict with the full comparability between lives. It can, however, have an eect on the
absolute personal value of a life. It can outweigh certain amounts of personal goodness
from moments at good levels of temporal well-being and against certain amounts of
personal badness from moments at bad level of temporal well-being. And it makes
a life that’s always at a neutral level of temporal well-being overall undistinguished
for the person living it. The contribution of the neutral temporal well-being in the
life will be overall neutral. But, in combination with the undistinguished atemporal
component, the life will be overall undistinguished.
Another natural suggestion is that
(7) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only if it is at the same well-being
level as a life without any good or bad well-being components.30
27 Broome (1993, p. 76) and Wolf (2004, p. 75). A complication is required if there might be people
who are only alive at a single point in time. At their single alive moment, they might be said to live at a
neutral level of temporal well-being if and only if that life could be extended with one further point in
time such that the extended life would be equally good for the person as a life that just consists of that
second point in time.
28 Broome (2004, p. 68) and Bykvist (2007, p. 101).
29 A potential temporal alternative could be that death or birth would be undistinguished for the
person dying or being born.
30 Arrhenius (2000a, p. 26). According to Broome (1993, p. 78), Part (1984, p. 388) thinks of lives at
the neutral well-being level in this way.
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Since it’s plausible that there could be lives without any good or bad things, there
should be a neutral well-being level if (7) holds. Gustaf Arrhenius provides the follow-
ing argument for (7):
This denition expresses, I think, the kind of conceptual connection we are
looking for. Could one claim, for instance, that a life has negative welfare if it
doesn’t involve any bad things at all? Could a life without any good things be
good for the person living it? That seems implausible.31
Given the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis, this argument is cogent. It seems that a life
without good or bad things cannot be at a good or bad well-being level. And, given the
standard trichotomy, the only remaining possibility is that it is at a neutral well-being
level. But, without the standard trichotomy, there’s a further possibility, namely, that
the life is at an undistinguished well-being level. It seems that a life without good
or bad things may very well be at an undistinguished well-being level, especially if
it includes things that are undistinguished. Hence the argument for (7) isn’t cogent
unless we assume the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis, which would be to assume the
point at issue. One might try to amend (7) by taking the neutral standard to be a life
without any good, bad, or undistinguished well-being components. But, as we shall
discuss later, there is perhaps no possible life without any undistinguished well-being
components.
A common proposal is that
(8) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only if it is equally good for the
person whose life it would have been as never having lived at all.32
The standard objection to (8) is that, in order for two states to be equally good for
some person, that person has to exist in both states and a person doesn’t exist in a
state where they never have a life. Still, I would like to stress another problem. Even if
it were possible to compare the personal value between one’s life and never having a
life, it might still be that no life would be equally good for the person living it as never
having lived at all. Perhaps each life is better, worse, or incomparable for the person
living it than never having a life. And then, given (8), no life would be at a neutral
well-being level.
We might instead try comparing lives with an arbitrarily short life:
(9) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only if it is at the limit well-being
level of a life l as the duration of l approaches zero.33
The underlying assumption of (9) is that a life arbitrarily close to having no duration
should be neutral for the person living it. This assumption can, I think, plausibly be
31 Arrhenius (2000a, p. 26). In Arrhenius’s (2000a, p. 16) terminology, a life’s having negative welfare
means that that life is bad for the person living it. Broome (2004, pp. 209–210) presents essentially the
same line of argument.
32 Part (1984, p. 487).
33 Blackorby et al. (2005, p. 25).
population axiology and absolute value 20
rejected. Perhaps such lives are at an undistinguished well-being level or even at a bad
well-being level because they are too short. As I suggested in the discussion of (6),
there could be an atemporal component of any life that is undistinguished. So, even if
the total temporal well-being would approach zero, the overall personal value of a
minimally short life could still be undistinguished.
Another proposal is that
(10) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only if it is at the same well-being
level as a life of constant unconsciousness.34
A rst potential problem is that one might think that a life of unconsciousness would
be bad. One might, analogously, prefer a quick death to being in vegetable state for
the rest of one’s life.
Another problem is that (10) conicts with the sentience criterion of moral status,
that is, the criterion that only sentient beings have morally relevant personal value.
Even though, for example, a human animal might have a life during which it is always
unconscious, that animal life wouldn’t be the life of a sentient being with moral status.
Hence that animal life doesn’t have personal value for anyone or anything.
It may be objected that it is not clear why actual consciousness rather than the ca-
pacity for consciousness should matter. Don’t we matter ethically during unconscious
sleep? Strictly, I think, we don’t. While we sleep, we only matter derivatively, because
we will matter when or if we wake up. Having merely the capacity for consciousness
only gives you the capacity for mattering; it does not by itself make you matter.
One might try to get around this problem by relying on degrees of consciousness:
(11) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only if it is at the limit well-being
level of a life l as the degree of consciousness of l approaches zero.
This proposal faces much the same problems as (9). Even if the total value of the
conscious experiences in minimally conscious lives approach zero, there could still
be an undistinguished component that is an essential to all lives, which would make
the life overall undistinguished. (One additional worry is that continuous degrees
of consciousness down to nothing would suggests that whether something is a life
comes in degrees, which would challenge a central assumption of population ethics.
I will not discuss this interesting challenge in this paper, however. My approach
requires that any positive degree of consciousness is sucient for the life to have the
undistinguished component.)
A further proposal is that
(12) A life is at a neutral well-being level if and only it is at the same well-being level
as a life such that, if that life were added to any population, the value of the new
population would be the same, other things being equal.35
34 Arrhenius (2000a, p. 21) and Broome (2004, pp. 208–209). Broome (2004, p. 142) uses ‘neutral’
in a dierent way than I do. A ‘neutral life’ in his terminology is a life that is at the critical level, that is,
a life with a contributive value that leaves the value of the population unchanged.
35 Broome (1993, p. 76) and Arrhenius (2000a, p. 21).
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It’s not clear, however, that there would be a neutral well-being level even given (12).
On, for example, Critical-Range Utilitarianism, there’s no life such that its addition to
a population wouldn’t aect the value of that population, other things being equal.
5. Dual Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism
So far, we have assumed full comparability between lives. This assumption, however,
rules out that there’s a range of undistinguished temporal well-being, given, as seems
plausible, that extending a life with a period of undistinguished temporal well-being
would make the extended and the unextended lives incomparable. Many of the prob-
lems with the interpersonal aggregation of well-being of lives in a population also
show up in the intrapersonal aggregation of temporal well-being. For example, if
we—in a manner analogous to Total Utilitarianism—aggregate the temporal well-
being of the moments in a life by their sum total, we get a personal counterpart to the
Repugnant Conclusion:36
The Personal Repugnant Conclusion (barely-not-bad version)
Each life at a very good well-being level would be at a lower well-being level
than some life in which at each moment is at a level of temporal well-being
which is barely not bad.37
Just like the standard Repugnant Conclusion, this personal counterpart is repugnant.
And the other conclusions we found repugnant in our discussion of interpersonal
aggregation have similarly repugnant personal counterparts. Since the problem with
repugnance in intrapersonal aggregation seems analogous to that in interpersonal
aggregation, it’s tempting to deal with these repugnant personal conclusions in the
same way as their interpersonal counterparts. Yet the critical-range approach we used
for interpersonal aggregation is blocked in the intrapersonal case by the assumption
of full comparability between lives.
To resolve this problem, I propose that we give up the full comparability between
lives and allow undistinguished levels of temporal well-being by summing not the
well-being of lives but instead the well-being of moments in lives. We also give up
that all good lives are better, and all bad lives worse, than all undistinguished lives;
in accordance with (5), some good and some bad lives are incomparable with some
36 Broome (2004, p. 218). I leave open whether these moments in lives have a short duration or if
they are instantaneous. If the former, we may need to weight the temporal well-being of a moment by
its duration, unless this is taken into account in the temporal well-being level. If the latter, we may
need, rather than to aggregate by summing, to aggregate by integrating a function that takes a moment
in a life as its argument and returns the temporal well-being of that moment in the life, the domain of
integration being the moments in the life. Compare Broome (1991, p. 227). Similar adjustment may
be needed also for the other formulas that aggregate temporal well-being in this section. This issue,
however, is orthogonal to the main argument of this paper; hence I will leave it open.
37 Temkin (2012, p. 119) states a similar condition in terms of impersonal value. See also McTaggart
(1927, pp. 452–453). Part (1986, p. 160) and Crisp (1997, pp. 24–25) make the point in terms of personal
value.
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undistinguished lives. We adopt Broome’s denitions for good, bad, and neutral
temporal well-being, adding the following denition of undistinguished temporal
well-being:
A person p who is alive at time t is living at an undistinguished level of temporal
well-being at t if and only if either
• a life just like p’s life except that it ends just before t would have been
incomparable for p with a life just like p’s life except that it ends just aer
t or
• a life just like p’s life except that it started just before t would have been
incomparable for p with a life just like p’s life except that it started just
aer t.
We can understand levels of temporal well-being of a moment in terms of how things
are for the individual at the time.38 On a hedonistic account, levels of temporal well-
being correspond to the hedonistic tone of the individual’s experiences at the time. It
might be that, in between the pleasurable and the painful ranges of the hedonistic
spectrum, there isn’t just a single point but a range. Sometimes, it seems tome, I’m in a
state which is neither pleasurable nor painful, and then my hedonistic state improves
or worsens slightly; yet my state is still neither pleasurable nor painful. This range of
the hedonistic spectrum which is neither pleasurable nor painful could correspond
to an undistinguished range of temporal well-being.
For a rst tentative revision, we dene a temporal critical personal value. One
calculates the temporal critical personal value of a life relative to a certain critical level
by rst subtracting the critical level from the level of temporal well-being level for
each moment in the life. Hence, in mathematical notation, we let the temporal critical
personal value of a life l relative to a certain critical level of temporal well-being w be
∑
p∈P(l)
(w(p, l) −w)d(p)
Here, P(l) is the set of maximal periods of constant temporal well-being in life l ,
that is, the set of continuous and maximally extended periods of time such that the
moments in l during the period is at same level of temporal well-being throughout;
d(p) is the duration of period p; andw(p, l) is the level of temporal well-being of the
moments during period p of constant temporal well-being in life l . One calculates the
temporal critical total value of a population relative to a certain critical level by adding
up the temporal critical personal value for each life in the population. Inmathematical
notation, we let the temporal critical total value of a population X relative to a certain
critical level of temporal well-being w be
∑
l∈X
∑
p∈P(l)
(w(p, l) −w)d(p)
38 Broome (1991, p. 225) and Bradley (2009, pp. 18–19). Compare Broome (2004, pp. 99–100).
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where again P(l) is the set of maximal periods of constant temporal well-being in
life l , d(p) is the duration of period p, and w(p, l) is the level of temporal well-being
of the moments during period p of constant temporal well-being in life l . Unlike the
formula for critical total value, the formula for temporal critical total value doesn’t
require full comparability between lives; it merely requires full comparability between
moments—that is, for any two moments in any two lives, the level of temporal well-
being of one of these moments is at least as high as the level of temporal well-being of
the other.
Consider
Temporal Critical-Range Utilitarianism
A population X is at least as good as a population Y if and only if, for all levels
of temporal well-being w in the critical range, the temporal critical total value
of X relative to w is at least as great as the temporal critical total value of Y
relative to w.
And consider, more specically,
Temporal Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism
A version of Temporal Critical-Range Utilitarianism where the levels of tem-
poral well-being in the critical range are undistinguished, the levels above the
range are good, and the levels below the range are bad.
Yet this revision is still unsatisfactory. Temporal Undistinguished Critical-Range
Utilitarianism entails another repugnant variant of the Repugnant Conclusion:
The Temporal Repugnant Conclusion
For any population, there is a better population consisting of lives that only last
a few seconds and are at each time at a level of temporal well-being which is
barely good.39
In terms of a two-dimensional vector diagram, the undistinguishedness in lives on
Temporal Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism can be thought of as a vector
that is proportional to the length of the life to which we add the balance of good and
bad in the life to get the overall personal value of the life:
39 Blackorby et al. (1995, p. 1304) and Arrhenius (2000a, p. 47).
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purely better
purely worse
purely incomparable
good
bad
length
balance of good and badtotal value of the life
neutral
undistinguished
As long as the each moment in the life is at a good level of temporal well-being, the
balance of good and bad will outweigh the undistinguishedness to make the life good
overall. So a population consisting of very short lives constantly at a barely good level
of temporal well-being can be arbitrarily good.
One might be tempted to dampen the repugnance of the Temporal Repugnant
Conclusion by having a wide critical range for temporal well-being so that a barely
good moment in a life is still much better than any bad moment. The trouble with
this move is that there are short periods of my life that I think clearly made my life
better, yet it is implausible that, for any population, there would be a better population
consisting of lives with the same short duration and the same temporal well-being as
one these periods in my life.
The way to avoid the Temporal Repugnant Conclusion and repugnance in general
is, I propose, to have two critical ranges—one for lives and one for moments in lives.
We dene a personal dual critical total value, for lives, and a dual critical total value,
for moments in lives. One calculates the personal dual critical total value of a life
relative to a certain critical level of temporal well-being and a certain critical level of
well-being for lives by, rst, subtracting the critical level of temporal well-being from
the level of temporal well-being level for each moment in the life and, second, taking
the sum total of these dierences and subtracting the critical level of well-being for
lives, and then the result is the personal dual critical total value.
The dual critical total value of a population relative to a certain critical level of
temporal well-being and a certain critical level of well-being for lives is the sum total
of personal dual critical total value of each life in the population relative to these
critical levels. Equivalently, in mathematical notation, we let the personal dual critical
total value of a life l relative to a certain critical level of temporal well-being wT and a
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certain critical level of well-being for lives wL be
∑
p∈P(l)
(w(p, l) −wT)d(p) −wL
where again P(l) is the set of maximal periods of constant temporal well-being in
life l , d(p) is the duration of period p, and w(p, l) is the level of temporal well-being
of the moments during period p of constant temporal well-being in life l .
We let the dual critical total value of a population X relative to a certain critical
level of temporal well-being wT and a critical level of well-being for lives wL be the
sum total of the personal dual critical total value of the lives in the population, that is,
∑
l∈X
⎛
⎝ ∑p∈P(l)
(w(p, l) −wT)d(p) −wL
⎞
⎠
Here, the inner summation aggregates the well-being of the moments in a single life,
and the outer summation aggregates in turn the aggregated temporal well-being from
each life in the population. Given that we have two critical levels—one for extensions
of lives and one for additions of lives—we can vary both of these independently in two
separate critical ranges and thus adopt the critical-range approach simultaneously for
both intrapersonal and interpersonal aggregation as follows:
Dual Critical-Range Utilitarianism
A population X is at least as good as a population Y if and only if, for all levels
of temporal well-being wT in the critical range for moments and well-being
levels for lives wL in the critical range for lives, the dual critical total value of
X relative to wT and wL is at least as great as the dual critical total value of Y
relative to wT and wL.
We combine this view with a corresponding account of comparative and absolute
personal value:40
The Dual Critical-Range Account of Personal Value
A life x would be at least as good for the person living than a life y if and only
if, for all levels of temporal well-being wT in the critical range for moments in
lives and well-being levels for liveswL in the critical range for lives, the personal
dual critical total value of x relative to wT and wL is at least as great as the the
personal dual critical total value of y relative to wT and wL.
40 We can modify the account of the absolute value of populations from footnote 23 to t with the
dual critical-range approach as follows:
A population is good (bad, neutral) if and only if, for all levels of temporal well-being wT in
the critical range for moments in lives and well-being levels for lives wL in the critical range for
lives, the critical total value of the population is positive (negative, zero) relative to wT and wL .
A population is undistinguished if and only if it is not good, not bad, and not neutral.
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A life is good (bad, neutral) for the person living it if and only if, for all levels of
temporal well-being wT in the critical range for moments and well-being levels
for lives wL in the critical range for lives, the personal dual critical total value
of that life is positive (negative, zero) relative to wT and wL.
A life is undistinguished for the person living it if and only if it is not good, not
bad, and not neutral for the person living it.
Note that there can’t be a life that’s neutral for the person living it if there’s more than
one level in the critical range for moments or the one for lives. The combination of
Dual Critical-Range Utilitarianism and the dual critical-range account of personal
value entails
Dual Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism
A version of Dual Critical-Range Utilitarianism where the levels in the critical
ranges for lives and moments are undistinguished, the levels above the ranges
are good, and the levels below the ranges are bad.
Translated to a two-dimensional vector diagram, these two critical ranges can be
understood as a base amount of undistinguishedness that is added to the value of
each life (corresponding to the range for lives) and an amount of further undistin-
guishedness proportional to the length of the life (corresponding to the range for
moments in lives). In addition to these two undistinguished components, we then
add the balance of good and bad to get the personal value of the life. To see how this
blocks the Temporal Repugnant Conclusion, consider again the short life which at
each moment is barely good:
purely better
purely worse
purely incomparable
good
bad
base length
balance of good and badtotal value of the life
neutral
undistinguished
This life is no longer good overall even though each moment in the life is at a good
level of temporal well-being. The added base component of undistinguishedness
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pushes the overall value further into the zone of undistinguishedness which swallows
the slight surplus goodness and makes the life undistinguished overall.41
These vectors of personal value of lives are then added up, like before, with vector
summation to get the overall value of a population. In this manner, we still retain
the Equivalence of Personal and Contributive Value. Hence Dual Undistinguished
Critical-Range Utilitarianism avoids the standard andWeak Sadistic Conclusions and
their mirrored variants. Moreover, this approach does just as well as Undistinguished
Critical-Range Utilitarianism in avoiding the repugnance in the aggregation of lives.
Given that the critical range for lives is sucientlywide, DualUndistinguishedCritical-
Range Utilitarianism avoids the barely-not-bad version of the Repugnant Conclusion
and the barely-not-good version of its mirrored variant. And we can give the same
defence we gave for Dual Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism in Section 3
for why it isn’t repugnant that Dual Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism
entails the barely-not-bad version of the Weak Repugnant Conclusion and the barely-
not-good version of the Mirrored Weak Repugnant Conclusion. And the dual critical-
range approach avoids the Temporal Repugnant Conclusion if the critical range for
lives is suciently wide, because lives that only last a few seconds and are at each time
at a level of temporal well-being which is barely good then have an undistinguished
personal and contributive value. Given that the critical range for moments is also
suciently wide, we can by an analogous line of argument—changing what needs to
be changed—show that the dual undistinguished critical-range account of personal
value avoids the personal counterparts to these problematic conclusions. Thus, in
conclusion, the dual undistinguished critical-range approach can avoid repugnance
in both interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation. Hence we have a population
axiology without repugnance.
It may be objected that Dual Undistinguished Critical-Range Utilitarianism still
entails that any population of bad lives is incomparable with some population con-
sisting of lives that are, at all times, at a good level of temporal well-being. Isn’t this
repugnant? But note that this will only happen in case the population of lives with
goodwell-being containsmostly very short lives. These lives also contain an atemporal
component, which is undistinguished for the person whose life it is. This undistin-
guished component outweighs the small amount of goodness in these lives. Intuitively,
it seems that lives that are very short with only a moderate amount of goodness in
them are not good. Even though there is nothing bad about them, they are too short to
be overall good. Yet existence of these lives do not seemmorally indierent, so they do
not seem not neutral. Given that we accept that these short lives are undistinguished,
it should seem strange or repugnant that enough of them will result in a population
that is so undistinguished that it is incomparable with a population consisting of
many very bad lives. This is how undistinguishedness and incomparability intuitively
41 There could still be lives that are both extremely short and good on Dual Undistinguished Critical-
Range Utilitarianism. But the temporal well-being in these lives must then be extremely high, perhaps
higher than any well-being levels we can imagine reliably. Hence we should not put too much weight
on potential counter-examples involving such lives.
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works: It greedily swallows goodness and badness.
Appendix: The Intuition of Neutrality
There is another puzzle in population ethics which concerns the so called ‘Intuition
of Neutrality’. This is another area where the possibility of undistinguishedness may
shed some light. Broome presents the intuition as follows:
Interpreted axiologically, in terms of goodness, the intuition is that, if a person
is added to the population of the world, her addition has no positive or negative
value in itself.42
He continues
The only value it can have is the good or bad it brings to other people besides
the person who is added. So if it brings neither good nor bad to those people, it
is neutral.43
Yet this last inference assumes the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis. Even if a life is
intrinsically (instrumentally) neither good nor bad, it need not be intrinsically (in-
strumentally) neutral. Without the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis, we have the further
possibility that the life is intrinsically undistinguished and hence that the life has an
undistinguished contributory value. Additions to a population can bring not only
goodness and badness but also undistinguishedness to the overall value of the popu-
lation. This overlooked possibility can, I think, solve a puzzle Broome has raised for
the interpretation of the Intuition of Neutrality.
But, before wemove on to this puzzle, it seems that, for the intuition to be plausible,
its scope needs be narrowed somewhat, because the addition of lives at very bad well-
being levels seems clearly bad and, perhaps slightly less clearly, the addition of lives at
very good well-being levels seems good. We shall therefore interpret the intuition as
restricted to additions of lives at well-being levels in a certain range, which we shall
call the neutrality range.44
A rst interpretation of the intuition is that the addition of a life at awell-being level
in the neutrality range does not change the value of the population. This interpretation
conicts, however, with the principle of personal good and the transitivity of at least
as good as. According to
42 Broome (2004, pp. 145–146).
43 Broome (2004, p. 146).
44 Broome (2004, p. 144) calls this range ‘the neutral range’. I prefer ‘the neutrality range’ because I
wish to leave open whether the well-being levels in this range are neutral; ‘neutrality’ here just comes
from the name of the neutrality intuition.
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The Principle of Personal Good
If exactly the same people have a life in population X as in population Y , then,
• if X is equally good as Y for each person who has a life in X, then X is
equally good as Y and,
• if X is at least as good as Y for each person who has a life in X and X is
better for some of these people, then X is better than Y .45
To see the problem, compare the following populations, where every life is at a well-
being level in the neutrality range:
well-being
the neutrality range
x x y x y
A B C
The letters inside the boxes represent the identity of the people in that population
or sub-population. According to the equal-goodness interpretation of the Intuition
of Neutrality, A is equally good as B, because the only dierence between A and
B is that the y people have been added to B at a well-being level in the neutrality
range. According to the principle of personal good, C is better than B. Then, by the
transitivity of at least as good as, C is better than A. But, according to the Intuition of
Neutrality, C is better than A, because the only dierence between A and C is that the
y people have been added inC at a well-being level in the neutrality range. Andwe can
run an analogous argument against A being equally good as C, changing what needs
to be changed. So, if there are two or more well-being levels in the neutrality range,
the addition of a life at one of these levels cannot leave the value of the population
unchanged.
A second interpretation of the intuition is that the addition of a life at a well-
being level in the neutrality range makes the population incomparable in value to the
original population before the addition. This interpretation avoids the last problem
but faces another; compare the following populations, where again each life is at a
well-being level in the neutrality range:46
45 Broome (1991, p. 165; 2004, p. 120).
46 The x lives in A and B can but need not be at a well-being level in the neutrality range. Hence the
argument only requires that the neutrality range includes at least two well-being levels.
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well-being
the neutrality range
x x y x y x
A B C D
We should grant that C is better than B, since C is both more equal and has a greater
sum total of well-being than B. According to the incomparability interpretation of the
Intuition of Neutrality, A is incomparable in value with B. Then, by the transitivity
of better than, we have that A is not better than C. According to the principle of
personal good, A is better than D. According to the incomparability interpretation of
the Intuition of Neutrality, C is incomparable in value with D. Hence a move from
A to D is bad. And a move from D to C is neutral, according to the Intuition of
Neutrality. But a direct move from A to C is not bad. Broome nds this implausible;
he argues
The net eect of one bad thing and one neutral thing should be bad. But accord-
ing to our theory, it is not bad; it is neutral.47
Hence
Incommensurateness is not neutrality as it intuitively should be. It is a sort of
greedy neutrality, which is capable of swallowing up badness or goodness and
neutralizing it.48
Neutral changes are intuitively those that—barring any holistic eects due to organic
unities—make no change to the value of the world. Assuming a weak form of separa-
bility between lives, we can rule out that A’s not being better than C is due to some
holistic eect between the x lives and the y lives. Let a neutrality-range addition be
an addition of a life at a well-being level in the neutrality range. Broome’s puzzle is
that the following four claims cannot all be true:
(13) There is a neutrality range of at least two well-being levels, and neutrality-range
additions make a population neither better nor worse.
[From the Intuition of Neutrality]
(14) If neutrality-range additions make a population neither better nor worse, then
they are neutral.
47 Broome (2004, p. 170).
48 Broome (2004, p. 170).
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(15) If (13), then it is not the case that some neutrality-range addition makes no
change to the value of a population.
[The upshot of the objection from transitivity and the Principle of Personal
Good]
(16) If neutrality-range additions are neutral, then it is not the case that neutrality-
range additions make a population incomparable in value to the population
without the addition.
[The upshot of the objection from greediness]
Broome’s preferred way out of the puzzle is to give up the Intuition of Neutrality—that
is, (13)—even though he admits that he nds it compelling.49
There is, however, another solution, namely, to give up (14). As we noted earlier,
the Intuition of Neutrality is that neutrality-range additions are in themselves nei-
ther good nor bad. Broome’s assumption of (14) overlooks the possibility that these
additions, even though they are neither good nor bad, are still not neutral. With-
out the assumption of the Absolute Trichotomy Thesis, there is a fourth possibility,
namely, that neutrality-range additions are undistinguished. This fourth possibility
is compatible with the Intuition of Neutrality, and it solves Broome’s puzzle. Since
undistinguishedness is the monadic counterpart of value incomparability between
value bearers, it makes sense that—barring holistic eects due to organic unities—
changes that are undistinguished make the world incomparable in value to the world
without that change. So, if neutrality-range additions are undistinguished, it is not puz-
zling that such additions make a population incomparable in value to the population
without the addition. And, since neutrality-range additions that are undistinguished
are not neutral, it is not puzzling that such additions can have the greedy eect of
counting against goodness and badness.
Another way to reach the same conclusion is to consider the Intuition of Neutrality
in combination with the intrinsic value of states of aairs. Suppose that we accept
the Intuition of Neutrality and that h and l are well-being levels in the neutrality
49 Broome (2004, pp. 143, 205–206). Broome (2004, p. 206) maintains, however, that there is a range
of well-being level such that it is indeterminate which of these levels is the neutral level, but he explains
that this is not supposed to be an answer to the intuition of neutrality—it is merely motivated by the
plausibility that the betterness relation is vague in general. Rabinowicz (2009, p. 399) suggests that we
can give up (16). He argues that, given that something is neutral in the sense that it is neither good nor
bad,
there is no reason to expect that adding things that are neutral in this sense will
have no neutralizing eects on bad or good things that are being added at the
same time.
I am not sure what sense of being neutral is meant here. Moreover, this is not a mere termi-
nological dispute. Just like ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘neutral’ is not a technical term we can dene
however we wish; it is one of the basic, pre-theoretical concepts in ethics. I agree with Broome
that a neutral change is one that leaves the value of the thing being changed the same.
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range, and that h is higher than l . Let then Ah be the states of aairs Adam’s having
a life at well-being level h, and let Al be the states of aairs Adam’s having a life at
well-being level l . Intrinsically good states of aairs are those that, in Roderick M.
Chisholm and Ernest Sosa’s phrase, ‘rate the universe a plus’; similarly, intrinsically
bad states of aairs are those that ‘rate the universe a minus’.50 Since neutrality-range
additions in themselves neither make the world better nor worse, it seems that these
two states rate the world neither a plus nor a minus. Hence Ah and Al are neither
intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad. It seems clear, however, that Ah is intrinsically
better than Al . But then, by (1), we have that Al is not intrinsically neutral, since,
if Al were intrinsically neutral, anything that is intrinsically better than Al—such
as Ah—would be intrinsically good. Hence Al is intrinsically not good, not bad, and
not neutral; it must therefore be intrinsically undistinguished. Thus the Intuition of
Neutrality requires that some things are undistinguished.51
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